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THE RIGHT TO DIE IN MONTANA: THE
MONTANA UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL ACT
William E. Hunt, Sr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Department of Health' rekindled public interest in right-to-
die cases that were first prompted by the case of Karen Ann Quin-
lan.2 Coupled with the recent cases on assisted suicide, right-to-die
cases have generated a great deal of interest in the already bur-
geoning patient-rights movement. Cruzan has since drawn unprec-
edented media attention to both the scope of patient rights and
the degree to which the state and the medical community as a
whole are able to influence sustaining or terminating an individ-
ual's life, particularly if the patient is incompetent. If individuals,
competent or incompetent, are effectively deprived of the right to
control their bodies, comparable constitutional rights would also be
jeopardized. Fortunately, courts and legislatures have intervened
to prevent this from occurring.
Given the esteem our culture places on both the value of
human life and the seemingly conflicting regard for privacy and
* Justice, Montana Supreme Court. I wish to thank the following people for assistance:
Edward Myers, my law clerk; Daniel McNamee, my summer 1991 extern; Annabel S-Y Fan,
my summer 1992 extern; Matthew Thiel, Editor-in-Chief, Summer 1993, Montana Law Re-
view; Jeffrey Monhart, Editor-in-Chief, Summer 1992, Montana Law Review; Cynthia
Brooks, member of the Board of Editors, Montana Law Review, 1992. I also want to thank
District Court Judge Joel Roth of Great Falls, who has been especially helpful. Finally, I
would like to thank the faculty and staff of the National Judicial College for providing me
with the opportunity to attend courses on Bioethics. These courses gave rise to my interest
in the subject of this Article.
1. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (upholding Missouri
decision that found evidence offered at trial inherently unreliable and not sufficiently clear
and convincing regarding patient's wishes, and ruling that a state may establish procedural
requirements for cases such as Cruzan without violating the U.S. Constitution). See gener-
ally John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139 (1991); Elizabeth D. McLean, Comment, Liv-
ing Will Statutes in Light of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: Ensuring
that a Patient's Wishes Will Prevail, 40 EMORY L.J. 1305 (1991).
2. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (landmark precedent upholding the constitu-
tional right of the terminally ill to be protected from nonconsensual bodily invasion and
authorizing father's request as guardian to discontinue all extraordinary medical procedures
to sustain daughter's life), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
and overruled in part by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985) (holding error to
disregard evidence of statements made to others "concerning artificial prolongation of the
lives of others who were terminally ill").
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individual autonomy, courts and state legislatures not surprisingly
have beqn forced to deal with problems of decision-making for an
incurably ill, incompetent adult. Since 1976, the federal govern-
ment,3 District of Columbia,4 and most states have passed legisla-
tion confronting the issue of the rights of the terminally ill.6 In
doing so, several states have developed the concepts of living wills
and surrogate decision-makers. Both of these concepts serve to act
on a patient's behalf should the patient become incapacitated.
These newly-born statutes rely primarily on the right to privacy
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and the common law prin-
ciple that a person has a right to self-determination and freedom
from nonconsensual touching.' These principles logically extend to
the core principle underlying the right-to-die cases-the right of
individuals to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Legal precedent
in the medical field, such as Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital7 and Pratt v. Davis,s have paved an easier path for right-
to-die cases. In both cases, the respective courts invoked the prin-
ciple of individual autonomy in recognizing a tort cause of action
against doctors who perform surgical procedures contrary to a pa-
tient's stated wishes.9 Likewise, the continuing administration of
unsolicited life sustaining medical treatment (LSMT) is perceived
as a violation of an individual's body and necessitates judicial
protection. l 0
A right-to-die case has not yet been argued before the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. In light of the activity in courtrooms across
the country, however, an increase of these cases is anticipated in
the near future. In exploring the broader legal and ethical issues at
3. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. 101-508, § 4751(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(w) (Supp. III 1991).
4. District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -
2430 (1989); District of Columbia Health-Care Decisions Act of 1988, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-
2201 to -2213 (1989).
5. See Right-to-Die Case & Statutory Citations State-by-State Listing, CHOICE IN
DYING NEWS (Nat'l Council for the Right to Die, New York, N.Y.), Summer 1992, at 1-13.
See also Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in
the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1298, 1298 n.243 (1991). See generally
Christopher J. Condie, Comment, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty
States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105 (1988).
6. See Peggy L. Collins, Note, The Foundations of the Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L.
REV. 235, 240-43 (1987). For cases concerning incompetent patients, see In re Moorhouse,
593 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
For a case concerning a competent patient, see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1990).
7. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
8. 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
9. See id. at 564; Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 95.
10. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1172-73; Collins, supra note 6, at 240-43.
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RIGHT TO DIE IN MONTANA
stake in right-to-die cases, this Article examines the provisions of
the 1991 Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act and the Act's
relation to right-to-die cases decided in other states. This Article
examines two major provisions of the Act, "surrogate decision-
makers"" and "living wills,"'" for their importance in the event of
court adjudication involving LSMT. Because of the sensitive na-
ture of right-to-die cases, avoiding litigation is highly encouraged.
This Article addresses how LSMT cases may be appropriately dis-
missed. Because some cases cannot be resolved outside the court-
room, this Article also explains the judicial process relating to
right-to-die cases.
II. MONTANA RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT
As a result of the national patient-rights movement, the Mon-
tana Legislature responded aggressively in .1991 by amending title
50 of the Montana Code that had, prior to the 1991 amendments
and additions, been entitled "Montana Living Will Act." The new
title, "Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act," reflects an at-
tempt to address the recent developments associated with the pa-
tient-rights movement." For example, the legislature amended
part 1 of the title by adding sections 50-9-105 through -108."' The
Legislature also amended sections 50-9-201 through -206."5 The
law was passed with the medical community's assistance and ap-
proval during the Fifty-Second Legislature. House Bill 6358 re-
vised the Montana Living Will Act 17 to conform to the Uniform
11. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103(1), (3) (1991). The popular term "surrogate de-
cision-makers" is not used in the Montana Act but refers to those designated to make deci-
sions pursuant to the Act. See generally Eaton & Larson, supra note 5, at 1318-20.
12. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103(1), (2) (1991). The popular term "living will" is
not used in the Montana Act but refers to "declarations" under the Act. See generally Ea-
ton & Larson, supra note 5, at 1297-1308.
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101 (1991). The Act requires that a patient have a
terminal condition. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-105(1)(b) (1991). Cf. New Jersey Advance Di-
rectives for Health Care Act of 1991, N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1992);
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 26:2H-56 (West Supp. 1992) (statute does not require patient be termi-
nally ill). See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986) (patient
was not terminally ill but had to be spoon fed for nourishment; patient successfully sought
the removal of the nasogastric feeding tube); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194,
1203 (Ill. 1990) (clarifying the definition of "terminal" as a matter of law to be: (1) when
"death is imminent" and (2) when "death-delaying procedures serve only to prolong the
dying process"). Illinois, unlike Missouri in Cruzan, did not adopt a clear and convincing
evidence standard that requires express patient intent.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-105 to -108 (1991).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-201 to -206 (1991).
16. H.B. 635, 52d Mont. Leg., 1991 Mont. Laws ch. 391.
17. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1989).
1993]
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Rights of the Terminally Ill Act as revised by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1989.18 To date,
twelve other states have also enacted rights of the terminally ill
legislation modeled after the Uniform Act.19
The general intent of the Montana Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act 20 (Act) is to provide competent adults with greater freedom
to control decisions relating to their own medical care.2 Consistent
with the constitutional right to privacy, the Act does not allow or
condone euthanasia, mercy killing, or assisted suicide;22 these are
separate legal issues. Nor does the Act require health care workers
to violate "reasonable medical standards" in carrying out the
wishes of the patient.23 Specifically, the Act affirms the common
law right of a patient to refuse treatment in cases where the treat-
ment would only prolong the natural dying process.2'
The Montana Act encompasses three significant concerns cen-
tral to the right-to-die: (1) the appointment of surrogate health
care decision makers for incompetent individuals, (2) the adminis-
tration and interpretation of living wills or declarations, and (3)
the determination of whether food and water constitute life sus-
taining treatment. The Montana Court has not had an opportunity
to address the provisions of the Act relevant to these concerns.
Nevertheless, examining the Montana Uniform Act, as well as de-
cisions of other jurisdictions, is helpful to illustrate the scope of
the Montana Act as it relates to these important issues.
A. Surrogate Decision Makers
Cases such as In re Quinlan5 and In re Conroy2 s upheld and
18. See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT OF 1989, §§ 1-19, 9B U.L.A. 109
(Supp. 1993).
19. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Rhode Island have enacted statutes based on the Uniform Act. See gener-
ally UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT OF 1989, §§ 1-19, 9B U.L.A. 109 (Supp. 1993);
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT OF 1985, §§ 1-13, 9B U.L.A. 128 (Supp. 1993).
Montana first adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act in 1985, MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1985) (Montana Living Will Act), and by amendment in 1991
adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of 1989. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-
101 to -206 (1991) (Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act).
20. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1991).
21. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 50, ch. 9 commissioner's comments (1991).
22. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-10-104 (1991).
23. The American Medical Association (AMA) has, in fact, issued appropriate ethical
standards and guidelines for right-to-die cases. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying
text.
24. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 50, ch. 9 commissioner's comments (1991).
25. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
26. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
[Vol. 54
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extended greater authority for the decisions of surrogates. Collec-
tively, these cases hold that an incompetent patient in a chronic
vegetative state has the common law right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment through a substitute decision maker, even
though death may not be imminent. 7 Subsequent cases have gone
even further. For example, the Florida District Court of Appeals
progressively addressed the issue in 1986 in Corbett v.
D'Alessandro."8 The significance of Corbett comes from the court's
recognition of the strength of a surrogate's decision-making; the
court upheld the surrogate's choice to discontinue feeding against
the express wishes of the hospital. 9 Although Florida's Life-Pro-
longing Procedure Act specifically excluded nutrition and hydra-
tion from a list of life-prolonging treatments that may be refused, 30
the court in Corbett found that the constitutional right to privacy
provided an independent basis for withdrawal of the tube and that
the legislature did not intend the statute to limit existing common
law."
The Montana Act authorizes the designation of a proxy or at-
torney-in-fact to make health care decisions in the event that the
patient becomes incapacitated.32 Section 50-9-10333 of the Act re-
moved an earlier provision requiring as a prerequisite that "the de-
clarant's condition is determined to be terminal" in order for the
proxy to be valid. 4 The new section now provides that there be an
"irreversible condition that ... will . . . cause . . . death within a
relatively short time."35 Further, the Act defines a terminal condi-
tion as "an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the ad-
ministration of life-sustaining treatment, will . . . result in death
within a relatively short time,"'36 and requires a physician to de-
clare a patient to be in a terminal condition for a declaration to be
operative.37
27. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1241.
28. 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla.
1986).
29. Id. at 371-72.
30. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3)(b) (West 1986). See generally FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.01 to .15 (West 1986), repealed by Fla. Laws 1992, chs. 92-199, § 10. The new Life-
Prolonging Procedures Act of Florida is codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.302 to .310 (West
Supp. 1992).
31. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 371.
32. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103(1), (4) (1991).
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103 (1991).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(1) (1989). See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103 com-
piler's comments (1991).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103(2), (3) (1991).
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(14) (1991).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-105(1)(b) (1991). Because it is still necessary under the
1993]
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Another addition to section 50-9-103 of the Act specifically al-
lows a surrogate to "make decisions governing the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment" if the patient becomes in-
capacitated.3 8 This treatment would include not only a respirator,
but also feeding and hydration tubes, assuming that these proce-
dures serve as life-sustaining treatment.3 9 The decisions of surro-
gates granted by the Montana Act have not been tested by the
courts to determine the exact degree of authority a surrogate may
have over differing wishes of other persons involved in the pa-
tient's welfare. The question of how much latitude the Montana
Supreme Court will bestow upon surrogate decisions in the event a
surrogate decision contradicts an institution's explicit policy or an-
other provision of the Act remains unanswered.
B. The Administration of Living Wills
The Montana Act also sets forth an outline of proper adminis-
trative procedures for the creation of a living will.40 In order to be
valid, "the declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another
person at the declarant's direction, and witnessed by two individu-
als." '41 Although the Act does not address the manner in which this
information is communicated to the physician, section 50-9-105
specifies that "[a] declaration becomes operative when it . . . is
communicated to the attending physician.""2 The declaration be-
comes operative only when the attending physician determines
that the patient is both terminally ill and incompetent to make
medical decisions. 43
Furthermore, an attending physician who is furnished with a
copy of a declaration must record this information in the patient's
medical record." Doctors who honor declarations are protected
Act to establish a terminal condition, a "chronic vegetative state" is clearly not covered. The
new Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act currently under consideration by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws does address patients in a chronic vegeta-
tive state. For a discussion of chronic vegetative state, see In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438
(N.J. 1987).
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(3) (1991).
39. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) (holding that feeding and hydration
are life sustaining treatments).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103 to -111 (1991).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(1) (1991). This comports with earlier case decisions
such as Conroy that specifically recognized living wills as evidence of the patient's desires
and also articulated other methods for a patient to set forth advance directives regarding
treatment preferences. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-105(1)(a) (1991).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-105(1)(b) (1991).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(5) (1991).
[Vol. 54
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from criminal and civil liability under the Act. Section 50-9-107
provides: "In the absence of knowledge to the contrary, a physician
... may assume that a declaration complies with this chapter and
is valid." 6 Physicians who comply with the Act and whose deci-
sions are made in good faith "are not subject to civil or criminal
liability or guilty of unprofessional conduct.' 6 A physician's pri-
mary concern is being held criminally liable for withdrawal of med-
ical treatment."7 Often the hospital or doctor, not the patient, seek
a court order to withdraw life support for fear of unexpected and
undesired retribution by the state or the patient's family.'
8
Cases often arise in which the attending physician is unwilling
to comply with the declaration and wishes to continue life-sus-
taining treatment.'9 Health-care workers who are unwilling to com-
ply with the removal of treatment must promptly take all reasona-
ble steps to transfer care of the patient to another physician or
health care facility that is willing to comply with the patient's
wishes.50 On the other hand, physicians who administer treatment
against the expressed wishes of guardians may be held legally lia-
ble for a variety of remedies, including legal fees, medical expenses,
and emotional distress.5 " If a living will declaration is revoked, the
Act requires only that the patient (or a witness) notify the attend-
ing physician that the patient wishes to revoke the living will.52
Additionally, the attending physician must make the revocation a
part of the patient's medical file.53 Should the physician fail to do
so, criminal liability for the violation would attach.5'
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-107 (1991). See also In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (N.J.
1987) (holding that medical procedures performed in good faith in accordance with the
court order would relieve the attachment of civil and criminal liability).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-204(1) (1991).
47. See Farrell, 529 A.2d at 415.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (Ct. App. 1986).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (1991). See Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 241
Cal. Rptr. 239, 241-42 (Ct. App. 1987) (after court order to remove feeding and reinstate
morphine dosage for pain control, patient was moved to another institution that would com-
ply with her wishes).
51. See, e.g., Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46 (awarding
attorney fees to patient for legal efforts to force removal of feeding tube); Elbaum v. Grace
Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (App. Div. 1989) (holding guardian not
liable for payment of unwanted treatment after explicit requests to cease feeding were ig-
nored). See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tortious Maintenance or Removal of
Life Supports, 58 A.L.R.4th 222 (1987).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104(1) (1991) ("A declarant may revoke a declaration at
any time and in any manner, without regard to mental or physical condition.").
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104(2) (1991).
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(4) (1991). Section 50-9-206 provides various other
misdemeanor criminal penalties for physicians and health care providers who fail to act in
19931
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One area left unilluminated by the Act involves identifying ex-
actly what constitutes an individual's competent state of mind.
The Act fails to provide any qualifications for determining the de-
clarant's competency or emotional state at the time of the declara-
tion. Absent this delineation, however, the judicial branch can gen-
erally reach a decision based on the evidence presented by the
parties during litigation."6 The potential for discrepancy among
case decisions due to a lack of judicial guidance in this area of the
law should be carefully monitored.
C. The Determination of Whether Nutrition and Hydration
are Life-Sustaining Treatments
The question of what constitutes "life-sustaining" treatment
to a terminally ill patient is central to the right-to-die debate. A
respirator considered necessary for the survival of the patient obvi-
ously would qualify as life-sustaining treatment, as would the ad-
ministration of emergency treatment to a heart attack patient. The
administration of food and water, however, has generated a whole
new debate in right-to-die cases.66
In 1986, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held in Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.5 7 that an artificial feeding tube
could be removed from a 49-year-old stroke victim in a chronic
vegetative state, in accordance with his family's desire to terminate
conformance with the Act. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206 (1991).
55. The National Center for State Courts advises:
A judge is not trained to make medical decisions. Furthermore, it may subvert the
ability of the court to base its decision solely and objectively on the evidence
placed before it.
When the court is requested to evaluate a medical decision in an LSMT case,
the court, as in all other cases where medical decisions are called into question,
should confine itself to evaluating the testimony of the relevant medical profes-
sionals and other evidence as submitted by the parties to the lawsuit.
COORDINATING COUNCIL ON LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION MAKING BY THE
COURTS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAK-
ING IN AUTHORIZING OR WITHHOLDING LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT 84 (1991).
56. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301-04 (holding that patients have
a fundamental right to refuse treatment even if it includes nutrition and hydration; the
right exists even if it would severely jeopardize or create a life-threatening situation); Far-
rell, 529 A.2d at 411 (suicide prevention is not a separate interest, but is encompassed
within the interest in preserving life). In Farrell, the court stated: "[W]e do not want to
impose any restrictions or burdens on the competent patient's right to have life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn if he or she is at home that would not be present if he or she were in a
hospital or nursing home." Id. at 414. See also Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr.,
516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 694 (App. Div. 1987) (overturning numerous rulings of the previous year
that artificial feeding could not be withdrawn).
57. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
[Vol. 54
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treatment. 58 The court ruled that "to be maintained by such artifi-
cial means over an extended period is not only intrusive but ex-
traordinary""9 and further held that the patient's right to refuse
treatment outweighed the state's interest in suicide prevention and
preservation of life.60 Similarly, cases in Florida and New Jersey
have reached comparable verdicts upholding the right of patients
to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration."' The crux of the nutri-
tion and hydration debate centers on the notion that removing
feeding devices does not preempt life but rather allows life to steer
its own, natural course and permits the patient to die with dig-
nity.6 2 Additionally, the American Medical Association's Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued the following statements on
bio-ethics: "It is not unethical to discontinue all means of life-pro-
longing medical treatment" for patients in irreversible comas (or
terminally ill)63 and "[l]ife-prolonging medical treatment includes
medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration,
nutrition or hydration.""4 An emerging consensus in the medical
and legal communities takes the position that artificial feeding is
comparable to other forms of medical treatment and, as such, may
be withdrawn at the request of the patient. 5
The Montana Act incorporates this prevailing attitude among
physicians and health care workers, and deems artificial nutrition
and hydration as life-sustaining treatment.6 6 The Act provides for
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from an incompe-
tent, terminally ill patient with one qualification in section 50-9-
202. This section states that "[t]his chapter does not affect the re-
sponsibility of the attending physician or other health care pro-
vider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydration, for
58. Id. at 639.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id. at 638.
61. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236 (upholding trial court's permission to remove feed-
ing tube from a patient struck with arteriosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, diabetes,
and a gangrenous leg). The trial court's rationale focused on whether life had become per-
manently burdensome to the patient. In so finding, the trial court ruled that prolonging life
would be "pointless and perhaps cruel." Id. at 1219. See also Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 371
("We are unable to distinguish on a legal, scientific, or a moral basis between those artificial
measures that sustain life-whether by means of 'forced' sustenance or 'forced' continuance
of vital functions ....").
62. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
63. See Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 638 n.38 (quoting statement of the AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs).
64. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 303-04 (quoting statement of the
AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs).
65. See id.
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(7) (1991).
1993]
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a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain. ''67
III. LIMITING THE NEED FOR FORMAL COURT INVOLVEMENT
The principle of personal autonomy is an unwavering constant
in right-to-die cases. Fundamental under both the common law
and constitutional law is the idea that competent individuals have
the right to make their own LSMT decisions . 8 Accordingly, courts
discourage routine use of the judicial system to review those deci-
sions. In landmark cases such as In re Conroy and In re Guardian-
ship of Browning, the courts' opinions consistently emphasize the
highly sensitive nature of the right-to-die issue. 9 When no conflict
exists regarding the patient's wishes, courts should not be in-
volved.70 In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of In re Conroy,
the court laid out both general subjective and objective tests to
minimize overall court participation in the ruling and relied more
on the expressed preferences of the patient.71 Many other courts
have since followed the Conroy guidelines.72
One valuable method of avoiding LSMT litigation involves ad-
vance directives for health care that clarify a patient's desires re-
garding LSMT.73 Federal and state legislation and professional or-
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (1991). Cf. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 305-07 (involving issue of patient's adequate morphine dosage for pain control,
where court ordered morphine to be administered at its former level to alleviate pain after
ruling that life support be removed at the patient's wishes).
68. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); McKay v. Berg-
stedt, 801 P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).
69. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220; Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
70. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987).
71. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229-32. The Conroy court laid out separate tests to handle
three distinct justiciable situations where feeding may be withheld or removed when it is
highly probable that a patient may die approximately within a year, even with the treat-
ment. The first test is the "subjective test": when the evidence clearly supports that the
patient would have refused the treatment under the particular circumstances. Id. at 1229.
The second test is the "limited-objective test": when there is some indication of the pa-
tient's preference but no clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1232. Finally, the third test is
the "pure-objective test": when there is no evidence at all of the patient's desires but "the
net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment clearly and markedly outweighs the
benefits the patient derives from life." Id. Conroy died before the case was heard on appeal,
but the court considered the case nonetheless and ruled that without further evidence, Con-
roy's case would not have satisfied any of the above three tests. Id. at 1219, 1242-43.
72. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 636-37
(Mass. 1986) (agreeing with Conroy that the primary focus should be a patient's desires and
the patient's experiences relating to pain and enjoyment rather than the type of treatment
involved).
73. Advance directives are instructions from a competent person regarding future
medical treatment decisions so that if this person is unable to make medical decisions, the
advance directive (e.g., a living will) specifies the medical treatment that the person con-
sents to or refuses, and may designate a surrogate decision maker. See, e.g., Conroy, 486
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ganizations, such as the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association, widely encourage the recognition
and use of these advance directives by health care providers. Natu-
rally, all practices and policies of health care institutions should be
made known to the patient and guardians as soon as possible. Ex-
perience proves that health care institutions developing particular
LSMT practices and policies and informing their patients of those
policies help limit unnecessary and inappropriate LSMT litiga-
tion."' Moreover, in the event of litigation, LSMT policies may fa-
cilitate the fair and expeditious processing of LSMT cases.
Other non-judicial alternatives for resolving LSMT matters
continually emerge outside the judicial system. Organizations such
as The Society For the Right to Die may be appropriate and wor-
thy of exploration.75 The courts, however, retain ultimate responsi-
bility for the fair, uniform, timely, and dignified disposition of
LSMT cases that present a justiciable case or controversy. Absent
contrary statutory or case law, a court generally will give careful
consideration and, when appropriate, more weight to the generally
accepted medical-ethical standards developed by health care, bio-
ethical, and other interdisciplinary organizations for dealing with
LSMT issues.76
IV. PRETRIAL ISSUES IN LSMT CASES
The trial court should decline jurisdiction in a LSMT case un-
less it finds that the parties genuinely disagree about the patient's
actual or probable wishes or as to the patient's competency to
make treatment decisions.77 Otherwise, the court would merely
render an advisory opinion. If the parties genuinely disagree, how-
ever, the court should not decline jurisdiction. If the patient is
found to be incompetent, a proper surrogate must be legally desig-
nated to speak for the patient's best interests. 78
A.2d at 1229, 1229 n.5.
74. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 448 (Wash. 1987), corrected, 757
P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988) (health care organization told the patient's mother that it would only
carry out her desire to withhold treatment if there was authorization by the trial court). Cf.
In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (where patient's wishes ex-
pressly opposite to the institutional policy were nonetheless carried out under court order),
aff'd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (per curiam).
75. For the purposes of this article, those alternatives will not be discussed, but see
the quarterly publications issued by the institute, The Society for the Right to Die.
76. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text discussing the AMA issuance.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
78. Generally, this procedure occurs before the case is filed. On some occasions, how-
ever, it is done simultaneously with the filing of the case, but certainly before trial. The
Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act specifically provides for appropriate surrogates.
1993]
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A trial court presented with an LSMT case must also ascertain
whether the proposed LSMT action comports with the law. If the
LSMT is legally viable, and the moving party has had an opportu-
nity to be heard, the court must make a determination before pro-
ceeding to a hearing or entertaining an order on the merits. First,
the court must determine whether a genuine issue exists that re-
quires resolution by the court, including controversies of fact or
law. Second, the court must determine whether the party or par-
ties commencing the action have a direct interest in the case; the
parties must have standing to assert the claim. 79 The exceptional
nature of LSMT cases warrants the court raising these matters sua
sponte. There rarely exists a genuine issue requiring judicial reso-
lution when a competent person makes decisions regarding
LSMT.8 The need for court intervention arises most often when
the decisions regarding an incompetent person's life are in
conflict. 1
Should a right-to-die case reach trial, additional procedures
become necessary to ensure early control and an expeditious out-
come. A trial court should establish and facilitate procedures
designed to identify LSMT cases immediately when they are filed
with the court. The movement of the case on the court docket
must be closely supervised and controlled from filing through final
disposition in order to avoid costly delays; where appropriate, the
court should make available all pretrial procedures in LSMT cases
to narrow the issues and facilitate prompt and fair resolution. In
addition, in LSMT cases, the court should have expert and investi-
gatory services immediately available to facilitate an expeditious,
efficient, and just performance of the court's adjudicative, supervi-
sory, and administrative duties.8 2 The court should contract for
these invaluable services when they are not readily available. The
results compiled by expert and investigatory services should be
presented promptly to the court and made available to all involved
parties.
Parties having a direct interest in the patient's welfare are en-
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (1991).
79. Determinations of whether genuine issues and standing exist are generally gov-
erned by state civil procedure.
80. But see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (patient was compe-
tent quadriplegic when he requested the removal of his ventilator system because he could
not imagine life without his father, his lifelong care provider, who had a terminal illness).
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
82. These services may be provided by organizations such as the AMA, Free Speech
Advocates, the Society for the Right to Die, Ethics and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing
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titled to notice regarding LSMT proceedings.83 Therefore, in addi-
tion to the patient, notice must be delivered to the patient's at-
tending physician and the health care facility or agency under
whose auspices the LSMT is maintained, proposed to be withheld,
or provided. An attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attor-
ney, or the patient's spouse, next of kin, close friend, or an associ-
ate 4 must also be given notice.8 In the case of an incompetent
person, the patient's guardian or guardian ad litem (GAL) must
also receive notice.86
Those individuals and organizations without standing to for-
mally join an LSMT case may only be heard as amicus curiae.
The trial court, however, has sole discretion to permit an individ-
ual or organization to file an amicus curiae brief or to testify. 8 In
determining whether to allow amicus curiae, a court should con-
sider the uniqueness or complexity of the factual and legal issues,
and the ability of the parties to adequately present the issues. The
contributions of those seeking to be heard as amicus curiae should
be weighed against the potential delay caused by participation, the
potential expense to the patient or family, and the potential physi-
cal suffering or emotional distress to the patient or family.89 Other
pertinent factors that courts should consider include the interest of
those seeking amicus curiae status and the privacy rights of the
patient and family.
As stated above, LSMT decisions made by, or on behalf of,
competent patients generally should not require court review."
Even when the patient is not competent, however, the court should
take reasonable steps to ascertain the current or previously-ex-
pressed wishes and views of the patient and keep the patient ap-
praised of the proceedings. A court may consider conversations the
patient engaged in regarding life support while still competent to
ascertain proof of the patient's LSMT wishes."1 If the patient is
83. See generally In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the pa-
tient, the patient's loved ones, and doctors are most properly involved in the patient's medi-
cal decisions).
84. "Associate" in this context means an associate of a significant period of time who
seeks to speak on the patient's behalf and is known to the court.
85. See Farrell, 529 A.2d at 416.
86. MONT. R. Civ. P. 4D(2)(d).
87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. 1990) (AMA filed
an amicus curiae brief that concurred with the court's opinion, but the American Academy
of Medical Ethics and other physicians as amici differed from the AMA's holding).
88. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
89. See, e.g., Farrell, 529 A.2d at 415.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
91. See generally In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (N.J. 1985).
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absent from the proceedings, the court should appoint legal coun-
sel, a GAL, or a guardian for a patient if the court determines that
an appointment is necessary to protect the patient's interests. The
roles, duties, and standards of performance of legal counsel, a
GAL, and a guardian should be clearly defined and communicated
prior to appointment.
V. AT TRIAL: JUDICIAL HEARINGS
Once pretrial procedures are satisfied and the court deter-
mines that it has jurisdiction over a justiciable issue, the court
should hold a formal hearing. Although a presumption exists in
favor of open hearings and public records, the court may take steps
to protect the privacy and minimize the anguish of the individuals
involved in LSMT cases by limiting public access to the
proceedings.
In the initial stages of the decision-making process, the first
issue the court may have to resolve is whether the patient cur-
rently possesses the requisite mental capacity to make an LSMT
decision. If the patient has sufficient capacity, the patient's wishes
usually control and, absent an overriding state interest, the court's
role is limited to enforcing the patient's wishes."' The statements
(oral or written) of the competent patient control as evidence re-
garding patient's intent.9 If a patient currently lacks the capacity
to make an LSMT decision, the court must determine whether the
patient, while competent, either appointed (where authorized by
state law) a health care agent (either via a durable power of attor-
ney, a living will, or some other mechanism) or executed a living
will without an authorized designation of a health care agent. If a
health care agent was duly appointed, the agent should exercise
the authority vested by the appointment, according to state law.
The court ordinarily has no further role in making the LSMT deci-
sion. If a health care agent has not been appointed but the patient
otherwise expressed wishes regarding LSMT while competent (ei-
ther by a living will, orally, or otherwise), these wishes should con-
trol, absent an overriding state interest.94 If the patient was never
92. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232 (holding that if a patient's preferences were to be
kept alive despite pain, life support should never be removed). See also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
93. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
94. The burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Swan, 569 A.2d
1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (following In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987) (general oral
statements regarding vegetative conditions were sufficient to provide clear and convincing
evidence)). But see In re Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515-17 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(medical treatment was withheld for an incompetent patient where no evidence was availa-
[Vol. 54
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competent, did not appoint a health care agent, or did not express
wishes regarding LSMT while competent, the court must deter-
mine who, if anyone, will make decisions for the patient and what
standards will guide these decisions.9 5
Under statutory and common law in many states, the patient's
next of kin 9e have the power to make decisions on behalf of an
incompetent patient who fails to appoint a health care agent or
express wishes regarding LSMT while competent.9 7 If the surro-
gate's LSMT decisions are challenged, the court must determine
whether grounds exist to dismiss or override the surrogate for fail-
ing to execute decisions in accordance with the standards estab-
lished by state law.98 In states that do not recognize "next of kin"
surrogates, the court must either appoint someone to speak on be-
half of the incompetent patient or make the LSMT decision it-
self. 9 In either case, the appointed surrogate, or the court acting as
the surrogate for the patient, must make decisions within the stan-
dards established by state law.
If the patient, while competent, did not express explicit
wishes, or if the patient was never competent, then LSMT may be
withheld or withdrawn, absent an overriding state interest to con-
tinue LSMT, according to the standards for surrogate decision
making followed in the particular jurisdiction. 00 These decision-
making standards may vary widely. The surrogate may conclude
that LSMT represents what the patient would have desired, based
on what is known about the patient's preferences and general val-
ues regarding health care, life-extension, and overall manner of liv-
ing. 101 If the surrogate lacks sufficient information to reach a judg-
ment or the surrogate's decision is precluded by the law of the
jurisdiction, the surrogate then may turn to the court for a deter-
ble as to the patient's wishes, even though the court reasoned that clear and convincing
evidence must rebut the initial presumption that an incompetent patient would choose life
and favor any procedure which sustains, prolongs, or enhances life; court relied on the
"pure-objective" test articulated in Conroy). See supra note 71.
95. See, e.g., Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d at 515-17.
96. In some unusual circumstances, non-relatives are also or otherwise deemed fit.
97. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987) (family members close enough
to make substituted judgment include a spouse, parents, adult children or siblings).
98. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
99. This option is seldom exercised and falls under the "pure-objective test" articu-
lated in Conroy. See supra note 71. See also supra text accompanying notes 32-39 on surro-
gate decision making under the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act.
100. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232 (stating that, regardless of the degree of pain in-
flicted on the patient, if the patient expressed her desire, while competent, to be kept alive
on life-support, under no circumstances should life support be withdrawn).
101. Most courts will require at least some evidence, if not clear and convincing evi-
dence, to support the surrogate's determination of the patient's intent.
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mination of the best interest of the patient.
While determining the patient's wishes based on a written
document (e.g., a living will, durable health care power of attor-
ney), the court should determine whether the document meets the
legal requirements to be considered as evidence, but failure to
meet the legal requirements (e.g., a letter to a friend) will not pre-
clude the court from accepting the document as evidence of the
patient's wishes. Admission of the document is discretionary with
the court.102
Other useful evidence of a patient's wishes that the court may
consider are oral statements made by the patient, or substantially
equivalent expressions by a patient who cannot speak. These state-
ments or expressions, however, ordinarily will not outweigh the
wishes expressed in a validly executed written document. 10 3 In de-
termining the wishes of a currently incompetent patient from oral
statements made by the patient when the patient was competent,
the court may find it necessary to relax the hearsay rule. Addition-
ally, the court may consider the patient's lifestyle or other expres-
sive conduct as evidence of the patient intent in the absence of
other evidence or to supplement any written or oral evidence of a
patient's intent. 04
Courts generally find it unnecessary to visit the patient
outside the courtroom during the course of an LSMT trial except
when a dispute arises concerning the competency of the patient,
the patient's contemporaneous wishes, or a question of fact that
can be readily resolved by direct observation. It may be desirable
to obtain the testimony of an outside physician in addition to the
treating physician's testimony, if the patient's medical condition or
prognosis under proposed alternative treatments raise an issue.
Weight should also be given to generally accepted medical-ethical
standards.0 5
Once the court reaches a decision, this decision should be
promptly communicated in clear, unambiguous language, along
with specific instructions.0 ' The court, in fashioning its order,
should consider those individuals and health care providers re-
102. See, e.g., Stark v. Circle K Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 479, 751 P.2d 162, 168-69 (1988).
103. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
104. See, e.g., id. at 1230 (religious beliefs or tenants).
105. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. 1990).
106. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 413-16 (N.J. 1987) (court directed procedures to
be followed at patient's home). See also In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 428-29 (N.J. 1987) (court
set out guidelines regarding removal of feeding in nursing home); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306-07 (Ct. App. 1986) (following removal of LSMT, court ordered mor-
phine dosage to be readministered at its former level for pain relief).
[Vol. 54354
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sponsible for carrying out the order. On post-hearing matters, ex-
pedited appeals are often required where the exigencies of the pa-
tient's circumstances so dictate. The court should take steps
permitted by law to expedite the case. A court may extend its ju-
risdiction even though a patient has died of other causes before the
appeal is ever heard. 107 Furthermore, where appropriate, the court
should retain jurisdiction over an LSMT disposition because liti-
gants may later seek clarifications relating to the court's proce-
dural orders.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the national patient-rights movement, the Mon-
tana Living Will Act was amended in 1991 to conform to the Uni-
form Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of 1989. In essence, this Act
affirms the common law right that a patient may refuse treatment
in cases where treatment would only serve to prolong the death
process.
Many issues surrounding the Montana Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act require clarification. For example, the degree of au-
thority to be granted a surrogate is, as of yet, undetermined be-
cause the "decision of surrogates" has never been tested by the
courts. Additionally, in the area of living wills, the issue of what
constitutes an individual's competent state of mind at the time of
declaration remains unanswered. Lack of judicial guidance encour-
ages discrepancy among case decisions.
Although an LSMT case has yet to reach the Montana Su-
preme Court, some of the right-to-die controversy has subsided
due to a nationwide consensus. A wide majority of states are now
willing to recognize a right to privacy against bodily invasion in
light of the growing consensus that supports avoiding extraordi-
nary life sustaining measures. At present, there is hope that the
Montana Code Commissioners will recommend that Montana
adopt, in the 1995 legislative session, the new Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act that the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws is presently drafting. This adoption would
address, among other issues, the health care decisions pertaining to
a person in a chronic vegetative state. If Montana chooses to adopt
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, it will be a positive step
107. See Farrell, 529 A.2d at 410 (patient died before case reached the New Jersey
Supreme Court, but the court retained jurisdiction at the urging of the patient's family
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toward clarifying important right-to-die issues that, up to this
point, remain unaddressed.
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